PROTECTING AMERICAN INTERESTS ABROAD: U.S. CITIZENS, BUSINESSES, AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
Nearly half a century ago the renowned British novelist and international traveler, Evelyn Waugh, presciently observed that, "In a few years' time the world will be divided into zones of insecurity which one can penetrate only at the risk of murder and tourist routes along which one will fly to chain hotels, hygienic, costly and second-rate." 1 Today, many Americans would likely agree with that assessment: simultaneously comforted by the monochromatic familiarity of restaurants and hotels that have become indistinguishable from one another whether located here or abroad; while increasingly leery of a world beyond our borders seen as populated by terrorists, kidnappers, brigands and bandits.
It is perhaps not surprising that such a world view of palpable threat and acute risk should exist given the seeming unrelenting litany of terrorist attacks, high-profile kidnappings, aircraft hijackings, extortions and robberies that have deliberately targeted or randomly entangled Americans either travelling or working abroad. To a large extent, this perception is grounded in an undeniable reality: for over three decades, terrorists have targeted the United ____________ * This testimony is based on the author's cumulative knowledge derived from 25 years of studying terrorists and terrorism. No Federal government grants or monies funded any of the work presented in this written testimony. The opinions and conclusions expressed both in this testimony and the published work from which it is derived are entirely the author's own and should not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. or is it not safe to travel to the United Kingdom? Am I at greater risk from terrorism by riding the London tube or from muggers while on the New York City subway? Is it more dangerous to visit the UK or to drive along one of American's highways to the nearest airport? The "Current Travel Warnings and Public Announcements" list of course makes no pretension whatsoever of being able to answer such questions, but at the same time it is difficult to disagree with the observation of these lists that was in Sunday's Washington Post travel section:
The warnings can be useful, but many travelers and travel professionals think the department often overreacts. Its current warning on Lebanon underlines the dangers of potential violence, but no travelers have reported problems there in years. During a two-week trip last summer, this reporter wandered the streets of Beirut without mishap. Even the southern parts of the country, which the [State] department described as particularly risky, seemed safe enough. 7 At the same time, moreover, in a country like the United States where student-perpetrated homicides in our schools have become tragically common, where national murder rates hover at around 16,000 deaths per year, and national violent crime figures annually exceed one million incidents, 8 the risks to United States citizens traveling and working abroad need to be put in an admittedly discomforting perspective of just how safe we are in fact living and working and going to school within our own borders. Another Washington Post article this past weekend (on Saturday's front-page), for example, called It is perhaps worth noting that on average, 26 Americans have been killed per year by terrorists since 1968: 11 in 1999, the year of the Columbine massacre, this figure was just two persons fewer than the 28 students killed nationwide in America's schools. 12 In drawing this distinction, I should emphasize that I am by no means suggesting that terrorism does not pose a genuine and dangerous threat to Americans traveling or working abroad and indeed that whatever the number of persons killed and injured overseas it is incontestably tragic that any American should lose his or her life to violence or be wantonly harmed and injured simply because of the nationality of the passport they carry, the uniform they wear, or the job they perform. Rather, it is simply meant to point out that in assessing the terrorist threat posed to American interests and citizens abroad-as in the assessment of all types of terrorist threats-one needs to do so soberly and analytically lest we overreact, fail to place terrorism in the context of the many other risks and threats that exist and thereby inadvertently succumb to the fear and intimidation that is precisely the terrorists' timeless stock and trade. 13 As noted last week in my testimony before this same Subcommittee, we then risk making hard policy and security choices and attendant budgetary allocations based possibly on misperception and misunderstanding rather than on hard analysis built on empirical evidence.
With that caveat in mind, let me now turn to the first of the three subjects that I have been requested to address: that of, the general security environment for non-official Americans overseas. I will then turn to examining briefly the types of threats against non-governmental organizations abroad; and, finally will offer some general recommendations for protecting non-official American interests abroad.
THE GENERAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT FOR NON-OFFICIAL AMERICANS OVERSEAS
Let me first point out that the above discussion of comparative threat assessment and relative risk analysis, drawing on cold statistics should not detract from the fact that the threat to Americans-including those travelling or living overseas in non-official capacities-is real, dangerous, and, I must note, arguably changing and growing in undesirable directions that could still more adversely affect U.S. citizens in the future. Whatever the figure, one point is incontrovertible: while the volume of worldwide terrorism fluctuates from year to year, and the number of U.S. citizens killed or wounded rises and declines depending on the overall level of worldwide activity and the violent dimensions of each particular terrorist incident that affects Americans, one enduring feature is that the United States remains the favored target of terrorists abroad.
As previously noted, since 1968, the United States has annually headed the list of countries whose nationals and property are most frequently attacked by terrorists. This phenomenon is attributable as much to the geographical scope and diversity of America's overseas commercial interests and the number of our military bases on foreign soil as to the United States' stature as the lone remaining superpower. Terrorists are attracted to American interests and citizens abroad precisely because of the plethora of readily available targets; the symbolic value inherent in any blow struck against perceived American "imperialism," "expansionism," or "economic exploitation"; and, not least, because of the unparalleled opportunities for exposure and publicity from the world's most extensive news media that any attack on an American target assures.
The reasons why the United States is so appealing a target to terrorists suggests no immediate reversal of this attraction. To a certain extent, as the However, the main problem that we face in this critical area of protecting American citizens and interests abroad from both current and future threats rubs up against one of the fundamental axioms of terrorism: hardening one set of targets often displaces the threat onto another "softer" target. 20 In other words, security measures may successfully thwart planned or actual terrorist operations or even deter terrorists from attacking: but they do not eliminate the threat entirely, which may mutate into other, perhaps even more deadly forms.
Determined terrorists, accordingly, will simply identify another range of vulnerabilities and hence potential targets; perhaps in turn adjusting or modifying their means and method of attack and executing a completely different kind of operation that still achieves their goal. During the late 1960s, for example, hijacking of passenger aircraft was among terrorists' favored tactics, accounting for 33 per cent of all incidents. However, as security at airports improved, as metal detectors and x-ray machines were installed at boarding areas, and as passenger profiling and other countermeasures were adopted, the incidence of airline hijackings declined appreciably to just seven per cent of all incidents in the 1970s and only four per cent in the 1980s. While these measures were successful in reducing airline hijackings, they did not stop terrorist attacks on commercial airlines altogether. Instead, prevented from smuggling weapons on board to hijack aircraft, terrorists merely continued to attack them by means of bombs hidden in carry-on or checked baggage. 21 The 1988 in-flight bombing of Pan Am flight 103 being an especially notorious manifestation of this trend.
In the current context of heightened threats to U. this is a reflection of a combination of developments and circumstances:
TYPES OF THREATS AGAINST NON-OFFICIAL AMERICAN CITIZENS AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS ABROAD
• The overall increase over the past decade in the number and duration of conflicts to which aid workers are deployed;
• A general absence of rules of war or rules of conduct among the belligerents themselves, many of whom are irregular fighters and may also include criminals and bandits interested as much in plunder as in the realization of a particular political agenda;
• A prevailing perception of aid organizations as particularly "soft"
targets that leads terrorists and other malefactors to conclude that such organizations and especially their employees can be "attacked with impunity"
• The erosion of the accepted neutrality of aid groups, who are seen by some belligerents as partisan, interventionist and generally an undesirable presence;
• A conspicuous lack of security among many NGO workers combined with a skeptical, if not averse attitude towards the need for security and other protective measures; and,
• The general rush to arrive on the scene of conflicts or humanitarian crises most needing help without adequate prior security preparation or thought. 44 going over evacuation procedures, addressing the effects of curfews, etc. In especially volatile countries or at times of heightened danger, local American embassies will organize a warden system for U.S. citizens and green-card holders resident in that country. The U.S. embassy will contact "wardens"
(American citizens who are chosen to represent certain zones of a city or other defined geographic areas) in the event of a security incident. The wardens then alert or pass on any embassy communications to persons in their zone. 45 In general, the problem with NGOs therefore appears to be two-fold. On the one hand, the NGOs themselves arguably pay too little attention to security and in the past has provided insufficient training and pre-deployment. While on the other hand, it often falls to the local American embassy to fill this void, whose efforts and activities in this respect can be limited as much by insufficient resources and too few personnel.
CONCLUSION: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NON-OFFICIAL AMERICAN INTERESTS ABROAD
It should be recognized that terrorism is not a problem that can be solved, much less ever completely eradicated. No country with the breadth and magnitude of the overseas interests and presence that the United States has can reasonably expect to hermetically insulate or seal itself off completely from any and every manifestation of this threat. In this respect, there are no broad, sweeping policies or new approaches in the form of overarching bureaucratic fixes or individual "magic bullets" that can hope to counter, much less, defeat a threat that is at once omnipresent and ceaseless. By the same token, we are neither powerless nor defenseless in the face of terrorism and there are a number of practical steps that might usefully be taken that might effectively mitigate the threat. These could include:
• Ensuring that our intelligence resources and capabilities-especially • Perhaps seeking to achieve further consistency and clarity in the travel advisories and other warnings and public announcements emanating from official U.S. government sources.
Finally, the threat of terrorism itself needs to be kept in perspective.
There is a thin line between prudence and panic. Accordingly, a prerequisite to ensuring that our formidable resources are focused where they can have the most effect is a sober and empirical understanding of the threat. Only in this manner can our efforts achieve the greatest likelihood of success and effectiveness.
Thank you for your time. I will be happy to respond to any questions that you might have.
